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Executive Summary
This paper, drawing upon historical data and information from surveys and
interviews with more than 50 legislators, lobbyists, and knowledgeable
observers, finds that the term limits reform adopted by the Arizona voters in
1992 has caused legislators to make some painful adjustments. Because of
term limits many legislators have decided to run for another office prior to
the expiration of their terms. This has often meant trying to move from the
one legislative house to another, most commonly from the House to the
Senate. On the plus side, the report finds that term limits have encouraged
greater competition for legislative and other seats and have given voters a
greater choice among candidates. To some extent, limits have been a force
toward a more inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have
generally reduced the power of legislative leaders and generally increased
the influence of lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have
gained equally. Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably
not any less knowledgeable than previous classes of newcomers, but under
term limits there are more newcomers and members have less time to learn
their jobs. For many, the limit to four two-year terms (eight years total)
provides too little time to learn how to do the job and do it well.
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Since 1966 — the year the “one person, one vote” standard forced a change in its structure — the
Arizona Legislature has consisted of a 60-member House and a 30-member Senate. Under the
plan, voters in each of 30 legislative districts elect two representatives and one senator for two-
year terms. The Arizona Constitution imposes the same age, citizenship, and residency
qualifications on House and Senate members.1 In 1992, Arizona voters approved a constitutional
amendment limiting individuals to four consecutive two-year terms in either the House or Senate,
though allowing term limits to start over if a member moves to another chamber. The measure
also “term limited” members of the U.S. Congress and top elected state officials. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court later voided the provisions of the law relating to Congress.2
This paper, drawing upon a wide range of materials — including over 50 interviews with
legislators, lobbyists, and observers — offers some tentative conclusions concerning the actual
and likely, intended and unintended, effects of the term limits law.3 The following section
discusses the nature and adoption of the reform and how, in general terms, it has blended in with
developments in regard to legislative elections and the operation of the legislature. Following this
largely historical account are sections offering a more definitive examination of the electoral and
institutional effects of the reform.
Term Limits in the Flow of Events
Seventy-four percent of those who voted on the term limit proposal in 1992 voted in favor of it.
Much of the vote may well have reflected unhappiness with the U.S. Congress. Much too, though,
seems to have reflected discontent with Arizona politicians, and state legislators in particular.
Arizona’s legislative term limit law came at a time when public confidence in the legislature had
sunk to what could well have been an all time low. The effects of term limits were felt before
2000, when it first prevented a group of legislators from running for re-election. After the 2000
general election, the impact of the reform was magnified.
Adoption of the Measure
Arizona in the late 1980s and early 1990s had its share of political embarrassments. In the late
1980s, Governor Evan Mecham was attacked on various grounds through a recall campaign,
court action, and impeachment proceedings. In 1988, after a long and bitter battle, the House
impeached Mecham and the Senate ousted him from office for misusing public funds and
obstructing justice. Three years later, a Phoenix Police Department sting operation, later known as
AzScam, led to the indictment of seven state legislators for accepting bribes from an undercover
agent posing as a gaming consultant trying to enlist support for casino gambling in the state. Not
surprisingly, surveys following AzScam showed that more than 70 percent of the Arizonans polled
agreed that Arizona lawmakers are too close to special-interest groups and that many legislators
would accept a bribe if they thought they could get away with it.4
Following AzScam, legislators attempted to restore the image of the institution by making a series
of reforms. In a special session they even toyed with the idea of putting a term limit measure on
the ballot but ultimately failed to do so. However, a citizen’s organization known as the Arizona
Coalition for Limited Terms (ACLT) took up the cause through an initiative campaign. Business
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and anti-tax groups played prominent rolls in ACLT. A citizen’s group formed earlier to push for
Congressional term limits also joined the coalition. ACLT’s drive led to the term limit law being
approved by voters in 1992. Reflecting their broader distrust of the legislature, voters in 1992
also approved a measure that required legislators to come up with a two-thirds vote to increase
taxes or other state revenue. 
Developments: 1993-2000
Republicans generally dominated the 1992 election. They retained control of the House with a 35-
25 edge and won back the Senate, which they had lost two years earlier by an 18!12 margin. At
the beginning of the 1993 session, legislative leaders noted that voter approval of the term limits
measure reflected strong public support for the idea of a citizen legislature. Leaders voiced their
commitment to this concept and, in this spirit, vowed to complete the work of the legislature in 100
days so that legislators could go back to their homes and businesses as soon as possible.5
Over the next several years, legislators from the Republican party’s right wing held most of the
leadership positions and, working with a like-minded Republican governor, set off to implement a
conservative agenda which was highlighted by a series of tax cuts. For much of this period
moderate Republicans and Democrats in the legislature were shut out of the process. There were,
however, several instances of rebellion within the Republican Party that one can partially attribute
to term limits. One of the most publicized of these came in 1999 with a revolt by a group of
approximately 16 moderate House Republicans who became known as the “Mushroom Coalition”
because they felt they were being “kept in the dark and covered with bull.” Coalition members,
including a number of freshmen, were especially unhappy about having had no input into the
budget — which, they charged, was made behind closed doors by a few legislative leaders and the
governor.
One of the movement’s leaders credited term limits for making first term lawmakers more
aggressive. She felt that because they had only eight years in the House, they were much more
eager to get things done and didn’t want to be left out.6 Another coalition member added:
“Because of term limits, we know we have to act sooner and take risks…. They have liberated us.
The speaker will be gone in a year. He can’t put me in the doghouse for the next 10 years.”7 Still
another rebel commented: “I was pleased to see the overall freshman class take an active role in
the legislative process, especially on the budget. I believe this will become the norm because term
limits compel members to ‘make their mark’ on public policy from the first day they are in office.”8
Term limits began to have other effects as the 2000 election neared. In some cases, it was
forcing legislators who had been serving since 1993 reluctantly to think about opportunities to
move on prior to the expiration of their term. One example was long-time House Minority Leader
Art Hamilton, who could have served until 2000, but decided in 1998 to run for Secretary of
State. He lost in the general election.9 In the 1998 election, as detailed below, the term limits law
may have had the effect of reducing competition for legislative seats because it encouraged
potential candidates to put off their campaigns until 2000, a time when there would be more
open seats.
Along with affecting elections, some observers saw term limits making a difference in how
legislators went about their business. The Senate president noted at the start of the 2000
session, for example, that lawmakers were trying to be influential earlier in their terms by vying for
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committee chairmanships and trying to climb into leadership posts.10 Later on, an example of
defiance of leadership — partially attributed by some to term limits — occurred during a special
session. Then, five Republican senators — three of whom were term limited and one who was
voluntarily retiring — broke with their leaders and signed a discharge petition to bring an
education spending measure out of a committee and onto the floor for a vote.11
Term Limits Take Hold
By the time the 2000 election came around, the legislature had experienced another
embarrassment, one which became popularly known as the “alternative fuels fiasco.” This
involved legislation, hastily passed at the insistence of House Speaker Jeff Groscost in the spring
of 2000, that provided large tax rebates to purchasers of alternative fuel vehicles. As originally
adopted, the law rebated the entire cost of converting a car or truck to run on natural gas or
propane and a third of the vehicle’s price. Lawmakers, however, acting hastily and without full
information, underestimated how many people would take advantage of the program. As more
and more people — more than 20,000 in all — chose the incentives, the original estimated costs
to the state of $3 million (the legislature’s estimate) or $10 million (the governor’s estimate) rose
to over $500 million. A poll taken in the wake of the alternative fuels episode showed strong
public dissatisfaction with the legislature — 52 percent of those surveyed thought the legislators
were incompetent, 70 percent said they acted on impulse rather than deep reflection, and 68
percent felt they were an embarrassment to the state.12 Aided by the alternative fuels fiasco, the
election of 2000 produced a 33 percent turnover in the Senate and a 45 percent turnover in the
House, the largest since the 48 percent produced in part by the AzScam scandal in 1992.
Term limits directly contributed to the turnover in 2000 by preventing 22 legislators, seven in the
Senate and 15 in the House, from running for re-election. Several of the term limited publicly
voiced their unhappiness with the law. One legislator who was forced out of the Senate told
reporters he would have been more than willing to run again for his old seat and wished that term
limits did not exist. He considered a run for Congress, but decided to take the unusual but  far
safer step of running for the House in 2000. He wound up winning the House seat.13 Matters did
not turn out so well for a term limited House member who, declaring “I’m not willing to give up my
career,” decided to take the unusual step of challenging an incumbent Senator from his own
party.14 He lost to the incumbent in a primary battle. Throughout the state, term limits produced
spirited primary fights. In one Republican primary, nine candidates fought it out for two open
House seats. In three cases where incumbents were forced out by term limits, they were replaced
by a relative — a wife, brother, and son — keeping the offices in the family. 
Republicans retained control of the House in 2000 but a 15-15 party split in the Senate led to an
unusual governing coalition as moderate Republicans and Democrats joined hands in a power
sharing arrangement under which Republican Randall Gnant of Scottsdale became Senate
president and Republicans and Democrats split committee chairmanships. Conservative
Republicans reportedly were relatively isolated and a bit unhappy. One said he would not run
again because the Senate was no longer a good place to work — it had become a place lacking in
courtesy and mutual respect.15 Matters initially became a bit more chaotic in the House than in
the past because of all the newcomers. One veteran legislator noted that the newcomers were
unprepared to do the work of the veterans they replaced: “They’re lost, quite frankly.”16
In the 2002 election, term limits along with redistricting contributed to an historic legislative
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turnover of close to 60 percent in both houses. Term limits directly ousted 15 members, six in the
Senate and nine in the House. This number included the Senate president, the House speaker,
the House majority and minority floor leaders, and the chairs of the Appropriations Committees in
both houses. The chair of the House Appropriations Committee later remarked: “I wanted to stay,
but I didn’t have a choice.”17 She saw no alternative but to challenge a popular senatorial
incumbent — a contest she lost.
Republicans retained control of the House and recaptured the Senate in 2002, ending the
coalition in the latter body that had governed in 2001-2002. The leadership of both legislative
bodies became more conservative. In the 2003 legislative session, however, Republicans split
once again, with several rebels leading the way in the Senate and another “Mushroom”-type
rebellion emerging in the House. A group of 20 or so Republican newcomers, both conservatives
and moderates, led the uprising in the House. The rebels were initially inclined to go along with
leadership, but, as the session progressed, resented being shut out by legislative leaders when it
came to making the budget. One participant remarked: “The budget is the most important thing
we do at the legislature…. We can’t just sit back and let it happen without having an impact.”18
The dissident Republicans, called themselves the “Cellar Dwellers” because they met in the
House basement.
Legislative leaders had given several of the newcomers what appeared to be important
committee assignments, in part, because there was a shortage of experienced members to fill
them. Newcomers later complained, however, that these positions actually gave them little power
because the important decisions were being made elsewhere. In the House, a newcomer serving
as vice chair of the Appropriations Committee could not even get into the meetings where budget
issues were being handled. The Cellar Dwellers became more assertive on the budget, demanding
and securing more information. One Democratic House member noted at the time: “This group is
more in a hurry, wants to influence the action, and is not willing to blindly follow leaders or vote for
something they don’t understand simply because leaders want it.”A long-time observer noted that
although freshmen in the Arizona Legislature had always complained about being left out, the
Cellar Dwellers seemed particularly anxious to get involved in a meaningful way. Legislative
leaders were not prepared for freshmen being so assertive and linked the rebellion, in part, to
term limits.
While the Cellar Dwellers ultimately made only a minimal impact on the budget in 2003, the
rebellion seems to have loosened up the budgeting process the following year, as leaders brought
more rank and file Republicans into the process through the formation of study groups. The
majority leader announced that this step was a result of calls from other Republicans to be more
involved. He partially attributed these calls for reform to term limits.19 Although House leaders
moved toward more inclusiveness, they also demonstrated a “get-tough” stance with dissidents. In
February 2004, for example, Speaker of the House Jake Flake took the unusual step of stripping
two moderate Republicans of their committee chairmanships for defying leadership on a measure
regarding Child Protective Services. In spite of this action, moderate Republicans once more
rebelled against House leadership in a dispute over budgetary matters in 2004.
Historically, as the above discussion suggests, term limits have prompted legislators to make
difficult decisions regarding their political careers and have directly and indirectly contributed to
legislative turnover. Term limits too have played a role in how legislators have shaped their
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legislative careers and how rank and file members relate to leadership. The following sections,
drawing upon interview, survey, and statistical information, elaborate on these and related
electoral and institutional effects.
Electoral Effects
In evaluating the electoral effects of term limits, we are generally concerned with how they have
impacted legislative turnover, competition for legislative and other offices, the composition of the
legislature, and the relationships between legislators and their constituents.
Turnover
Arizona has long been characterized by relatively frequent
turnover among legislators, often from 20 to 30 percent. In
recent years, thanks at least in part to term limits, the rate
generally has been rising. Thus far, term limits have directly
contributed to turnover by forcing 37 Arizona legislators out
of office — 22 of these were forbidden from running for re-
election in 2000 and 15 from running for re-election in
2002. Public statements, some of which were noted above,
and interviews conducted for this study suggest that most of
the term limited legislators would have been more than
willing to run for re-election had they been given the chance.
In addition, interviews and published reports indicate that
term limits have played an important part in encouraging
some, perhaps many, legislators to leave office prior to the
expiration of their term in an effort to take advantage of an
opportunity to continue their political careers elsewhere.20
Thus far, term limits have directly prevented about 30
percent of the legislators subject to the law — that is, 37 of
122 legislators in the combined “freshman classes” of 1993
and 1995 — from seeking re-election to either the Senate or
the House. This is perhaps a bit low considering the
expectations of term limits proponents and their
assumptions about the extent to which legislators cling to their offices, but not particularly
shocking when one considers the legislature’s turnover history. The figures also suggest that their
ability to move from one house to another has enabled several legislators to put in a full eight
years of continuous legislative service and still avoid term limits. Fourteen House members of the
freshman classes of 1993 and 1995 were able to do this by moving to the Senate prior to the
expiration of their House term. Because of this, while close to half of all House members in these
freshman classes served eight years in the legislature, only about 30 percent of them were term
limited. Looking just at the 37 who have been forced out, members representing Pima County
(Tucson) have suffered the most from term limits. Though the differences are not very
pronounced, term limits have also affected senators more than representatives, Republicans
more than Democrats, and males more than females.
Table 1
Legislative Turnover since 1981*
(Percent)
Year(s) House Senate
1981-
1990
25 23
1990 25 33
1992 48 37
1994 35 33
1996 32 37
1998 25 23
2000 45 33
2002 58 60
*Measurement made by checking the
rosters at the beginning of the first session
immediately after an election.
Source: Gary Moncrief, Richard Niemi
and Lynda Powell. 2004. “Time, Term
Limits, and Turnover,” Legislative
Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming).
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In a broad perspective the term limit law has succeeded not so much in pushing legislators out of
politics as it has in prompting them to seek other elected positions. As Table 3 indicates, 27 of
the 37 term limited legislators, over 70 percent of them, attempted to continue their political
careers in an uninterrupted
fashion by immediately getting
elected to the other house or to
some other office. Sixteen of the
27 who ran for office, 59 percent
were successful (three term limited
legislators lost to another term
limited legislator). Term limited
legislators have demonstrated a
strong desire to stay in an elected
environment and, by and large,
have been able to do so. When it
comes to elective offices, Arizona
has a good “opportunity structure”
— a governing system that provides
a generous number of positions on
the local as well as state level for
those seeking elective office.21
Table 2
Effects of Term Limits on Legislators Serving in the
Freshman Classes of 1993 and 1995
(Percentages of Total in Parenthesis)
Item Total Number
Served All Eight
Years
in One or Both
Houses 
Served All Eight
Years but Moved
to the Other
House
Served All Eight
Years in Same
House (term
limited)
Total Members 122 (100%) 51 (42%) 14 (11%) 37 (30%)
House Members 82 (67%) 38 (46%) 14 (17%) 24 (29%)
Senate Members 40 (33%) 13 (33%) 0 (0%) 13 (33%)
Republicans 77 (63%) 31 (40%) 6 (17%) 25 (32%)
Democrats 45 (37%) 20 (44%) 8 (18%) 12 (27%)
Male 79 (65%) 33 (42%) 8 (10%) 25 (32%)
Female 43 (35%) 18 (42%) 6 (14%) 12 (28%)
Maricopa County 77 (63%) 29 (38%) 8 (10%) 21 (27%)
Pima County 21 (17%) 14 (67%) 4 (19%) 10 (48%)
Rural Counties 24 (20%) 8 (33%) 2 (8%) 6 (25%)
Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.
Table 3
Actions of Term Limited Legislators in the Next Election
Item Total Percent
Term limited legislators 37 100
Senate members 13 35
House members 24 65
Term limited legislators: What they did
House members who ran for Senate 15 41
Senate members who ran for House 2 5
Those who ran for other offices 10 27
Staying in elective office
Those who won any office 16 43
Those elected to other legislative body 11 30
Those who lost to another term limited legislator 3 8
Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison Institute for Public Policy, 2004.
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Competition and Voter Choice
One anticipated benefit of term limit reform was
that by creating more open seats, there would be
greater competition for legislative offices and,
thus, greater voter choice among candidates. The
actual net effect of term limits on competition,
though, is difficult to pinpoint. Available
information is somewhat positive in showing a
slight overall increase in the number of pre-
primary legislative candidates from 1998 to 2000.
Although the number dipped slightly in 2002, it
was still higher at that time than in the 1990s.
There are, however, several caveats one should
take into account in interpreting these findings.
For one, the term limits law itself may have
created the large drop in candidates between
1996 and 2000 — many people appear to have
passed up the opportunity to run in 1998 so that
they could contend for one of the many seats
forced open by term limits in the 2000 election. As one legislator remarked in 1998: “Why
compete for something that will be an open seat in two years.”22 For this reason, the gap in
turnout between 1998 and 2000 may have been distorted. Another difficulty in interpreting the
effects of term limits is untangling the impact of this reform on the 2000 and 2002 elections from
that of state public campaign financing, adopted by voters in 1998 and first implemented in
2000. Survey research leads us to believe that both were important, but which of the two was
more important is uncertain.23
In assessing the effects of term limits on competition, one also has to note that these, to some
extent, could have been negative as well as positive. Some interviewees suggested, for example,
that term limits have discouraged competition by making the office more of a “dead-end” position
and, thus, less attractive from a career perspective. On the whole, however, the extent to which
the “dead-end” nature of the office has discouraged people from running seems minimal. Some
interviewees felt the term limited nature of the office has generally little to do with the decision to
run or not to run. Prospective candidates either do not think about term limits or find them far
less important than other factors, such as the amount of competition and the availability of
campaign funds.24 From the historical data, it appears that many of those who decide to run do
not expect to be in the legislature long enough to be term limited — that eight years is more than
enough time to do what they want. Some too may feel that if they decided to stay around they
could always do so by moving to the other house (this, as noted later, is a common ambition). In
essence, many may not perceive the job to be a dead-end one.
On the whole, interviewees suggested that by creating more open seats, term limits have
encouraged greater competition for legislative positions and more choices for voters. People, they
said, have run for office who would not have done so if they had to face an incumbent. To a
certain extent, term limits have also increased competition for various offices by encouraging or
forcing legislators to look elsewhere to continue their political careers. Within the legislature, the
Table 4
Legislative Candidates Since 1990*
Election
Year
Total
Candidates
Candidates
per Seat
Population
per Seat
1990 189 2.1 40,724
1992 207 2.3 42,778
1994 180 2.0 45,000
1996 211 2.3 46,987
1998 162 1.8 51,111
2000 223 2.5 57,007
2002 217 2.4 61,111
*Number of candidates filing pre-primary nominating
petitions for a seat in the 90-member Arizona Legislature.
Does not include write-ins or post-primary filers.
Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.
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desire to continue political careers has frequently prompted legislators in one house to refocus
their effort on getting elected to the other house, thus increasing the competitive pool for these
positions. Movement of this type is encouraged by the fact that senators and representatives are
elected from the same districts — a switch means no change in the electoral base. By forcing out
legislators anxious to continue their careers, the reform has also indirectly improved the general
competitive situation by providing additional candidates for a variety of other races such as
secretary of state, state treasurer, state corporation commission, and a variety of local offices.
Composition
When it comes to the composition of the legislature, supporters of term limits felt that this reform
would bring greater representation to women, minorities, members of the minority party, and,
more generally, people with new ideas and outlooks. Proponents also expected that term limits
would lead to the replacement of career politicians in the legislature by citizen legislators
uninterested in building political careers. Changes in these directions, however, are difficult to
discern in Arizona. 
Compared to other states, Arizona is a place where
women always have done well as legislative
candidates, though women have been very under-
represented when compared to their number in the
population. Since term limits went into effect, the
number of women legislators has actually declined,
as it has on a national basis in recent years. In the
first round of term limits, women did relatively well:
five of the 32 women serving in 1993, (16%) were
eventually term limited, compared to 17 of the 60
men (28%). Matters, however, were reversed for
the class of 1995: seven of the 11 women elected
that year (64%) wound up term limited compared to
eight of the 19 men (42%).
Thus far, term limits appear to have made little
difference in regard to the representation of
minorities. In recent years, there have been gains
in legislative seats for Hispanics, but Native
Americans and African Americans have held steady
or lost representation (some gains in Hispanic
representation have come at the expense of
African Americans). The number of Hispanics has
grown from nine in 1997 to 13 in 2003, the largest
delegation ever, in large part because of district
changes. 
Republicans have controlled the state House of
Representatives since 1966 — the year the “one-
person, one vote” standard forced a change in the
basic structure of the legislature — and have lost
Table 5
Women in the Arizona Legislature*
Years
House
Number
(Percent)
Senate
Number
(Percent)
Total
Number
(Percent)
1993-94 23 (38%) 9 (30%) 32 (36%)
1995-96 19 (32%) 8 (27%) 27 (30%)
1997-98 25 (42%) 8 (27%) 33 (37%)
1999-00 25 (42%) 7 (23%) 32 (36%)
2001-02 22 (37%) 9 (30%) 31 (34%)
2003-04 16 (27%) 8 (27%) 24 (27%)
*Based on election results only.
Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.
Table 6
Seats Held by Democrats
Years
House
Number
(Percent)
Senate
Number
(Percent)
Total
Number
(Percent)
1993-94 25 (42%) 12 (40%) 37 (41%)
1995-96 22 (37%) 11 (37%) 33 (37%)
1997-98 22 (37%) 12 (40%) 34 (38%)
1999-00 20 (33%) 14 (47%) 34 (38%)
2001-02 24 (40%) 15 (50%) 39 (43%)
2003-04 21 (35%) 13 (44%) 34 (38%)
Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.
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control of the Senate on only a few occasions since that time. In
2001-2002 a 15-15 tie between Democrats and Republicans in
the Senate produced an unusual governing coalition as moderate
Republicans and Democrats joined hands, and more conservative
Republicans found themselves isolated. Following the 2002
election, Republicans recaptured the Senate and the coalition
came to an end.
With the exception of a modest bump upward in the 2000 election,
Democrats have made few gains since term limits. Term limits
have prevented 37 from running for re-election but these people
have largely been replaced by others from the same party. The
underlying issue with party representation is that the redistricting
process, whether conducted by the legislature or an independent
commission, has created districts that overwhelmingly favor one
party over the other.
Recent elections have brought some demographic changes.
Agewise, for example, the Senate appears to be getting a bit older,
in part, perhaps, because term limits have encouraged older and more experienced House
members to move to the Senate. Contrary to the hopes of term limits supporters, however, the
reform has not filled legislative chambers with citizen legislators with little or no political ambition
who are willing to return to their private lives after a
few years of service. The legislature is attractive to
career politicians. Most Arizona legislators,
according to a 2002 survey of that body, plan to run
for another office sometime in their career and only
a few plan to retire following their current legislative
service. Under term limits they are forced to find
ways of staying in legislative office, for example, by
switching from one house to the other, and taking
advantage of opportunities for other positions as
soon as they appear. Many spend much time
preparing their next move, a preoccupation that
some interviewees felt distracts them from their
duties as legislators.
On the positive side, term limits have meant there
are more legislators with experience in both
legislative chambers. To a certain extent, the House
has always served as a training ground for the
Senate. Yet, while movement from the House to the
Senate was common prior to term limits, it has
since accelerated. Those interviewed expect the
trend to continue accelerating. Eleven term limited
legislators made this switch in 2000 and 2002.
Since term limits went into effect, a few legislators
Table 7
Average Age of Legislators*
Session
Starting House Senate
1993 49.1 49.7
1995 49.3 50.1
1997 49.6 49.5
1999 47.5 52.2
2001 49.2 51.8
2003 49.2 53.2
*Calculated from legislators’
biographies.
Source: David Berman, Ph.D.,
Morrison Institute for Public
Policy, 2004.
Table 8
“Arizona Legislators: After service in the
present chamber, what are you likely to do?”
(number of respondents=44)
Item
Number
Checking Percent
Run for other chamber* 21 48
Run for statewide office 9 21
Run for U.S. House or Senate 9 21
Run for local office 7 16
Retire 5 11
Take appointive office 4 9
Return to non-political career 4 9
Engage in lobbying/consulting 4 9
No further office 3 7
*Nineteen of the 21 legislators who planned to run for the
other chamber were serving in the House.
Source: Survey by John M. Carey, Gary F. Moncrief,
Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell, 2002, in
cooperation with the Joint Project on Term Limits,
supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation and
a grant from the National Science Foundation.
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have even moved from the Senate to the “lower” House. Switches from one body to another
reduce the loss of expertise in the legislature as a whole and encourage cross fertilization and
greater awareness and understanding of the other house. On the other hand, the movement
undermines the term limit goal of bringing new people into office. It has also produced tension by
increasing the competition for leadership positions. 
Representation
Interviews suggest that term limits have made little impact on the way lawmakers regard their
constituents. The principal exception to this may occur as lawmakers become lame ducks in their
last two years in office and, thus, feel free to take some action that is unpopular among their
constituents without fear of being punished at the polls. Some of those interviewed gave
examples of this type of behavior. On the other hand, many legislators seem willing to continue to
cater to people in their districts even as they near the end of their eight year terms either because
they hope to regain the seat after sitting out one term or to represent the same people as a
member of the other house. Many legislators appear to have become more future-oriented in
thinking about their political careers, but often their ambitions center on appealing to the same
set of constituents.
General Institutional Effects
When it comes to the legislative body itself, term limits in
Arizona have made three basic underlying changes:
(1) enlarging the pool of inexperienced legislators; (2)
converting legislators into a group of short-timers; and
(3) creating a situation where, in the opinion of many, there is
too little time to work out basic operational problems caused
by inexperience or to devote to long-term issues of concern to
the state. 
The Inexperience Problem
Along with contributing to turn over, term limits have
contributed to a marked decline in the level of legislative
experience. In 1990, the average representative had seven
years of legislative service and the average senator had 11
years. By contrast, in 2003 the average number of years was
two for representatives and approximately six for senators. In
the ten-year period prior to the adoption of term limits, 1983-
1992, the average service was 6.5 years for representatives
and over nine for senators. In the post term limits decade,
1993-2003, the average dropped to 3.5 for representatives
and seven for senators. 
Term limits have led to the departure of several old-timers
and, with this, a loss of institutional memory regarding
programs, policies, and legislative norms, a loss of expertise
in various policy areas, and the loss of people who could hold
their own in dealing with lobbyists, staff, and agency heads.
Table 9
Legislative Experience
Average Number of Years
Period
House
Members
Senate
Members
1990 7.0 11.0
1991 6.3 6.8
1992 6.5 7.6
1993 4.4 6.6
1994 5.0 7.5
1995 3.6 6.2
1996 4.6 7.1
1997 3.8 6.2
1998 4.8 7.2
1999 3.3 7.4
2000 4.3 8.4
2001 2.7 7.0
2002 3.6 7.7
2003 2.0 5.9
1973-1982 5.3 5.9
1983-1992 6.5 9.4
1992-2003 3.5 7.0
Source: Arizona Legislative Council,
2004.
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Conversely, the increase in the number of inexperienced legislators has produced a body where
more legislators are uncertain about how to do their jobs and are relatively uninformed about the
issues facing the state. Interviewees also suggested that new legislators are more vulnerable to
manipulation and control by lobbyists, staff, and executive agency heads and more likely to make
mistakes. Some interviewees contended that inexperience had already figured in policy mistakes,
including the alternative fuels fiasco, because newcomers failed to pick up on danger signals that
more experienced lawmakers regularly catch. Interviewees felt that the problems associated with
inexperience have been compounded in the term limited setting because legislators are more
likely to move to positions of leadership before they are ready for such positions. Overall, though,
they suggested that the Senate may be less affected than the House by inexperience problems
because it has more experienced members.
Short-Sightedness
Along with the inexperience problem, interviewees suggested that term limits have created
difficulties by encouraging members to be short-sighted. Knowing that they can serve only so long,
legislators are more in a hurry to make their mark and move on. In this regard one interviewee
noted: “When you realize you only have eight years at the most, everything has to happen much
quicker.” Being in a hurry means trying to gain notice by the introduction of bills that are not all
that vital and trying to move up quickly into important committee or leadership positions. Short-
timer status was also equated by observers with chilling the legislative climate — making
members less likely to take the time to get to know each other or to try to get along, less willing to
compromise, less inclined to listen to leadership, less respectful of the process, and less likely to
care about the welfare of the institution as a whole. On policy issues, the short-timer orientation
was felt to have encouraged legislators to be relatively more concerned with a set of issues which
have immediate payoffs, ignore the long-term implications of their decisions, and to be less
concerned with solving long-range problems or multi-year undertakings.
Too Little Time
A third largely negative impact stemming from the term limit imposition in Arizona, in the eyes of
many of those interviewed, is that the eight-year limit simply does not provide enough time.
Several interviewees suggested, for example, that the problems associated with inexperience are
likely to be permanent because their resolution requires more years of on-the-job training than
allowed by the law. Though there was considerable disagreement among those interviewed on
just how long it takes to learn the legislative job, several legislators remarked that for most
legislators, especially legislative leaders, this required at least six years. Thus, with an eight-year
limit, legislators are forced out of office just as they begin to understand the issues and can stand
on their own two feet. Interviewees also saw time limits as undermining what had been a highly
functional mellowing process in the Arizona legislature — one where long years of service had
tended to make ideologically driven legislators more moderate or pragmatic as members got to
know each other on a personal basis and formed friendships that transcended party lines, making
it easier to form bipartisan coalitions. Another aspect of the time problem was that the short
amount of time allowed prevented legislators from focusing on long-term problems facing the
state, even if they were predisposed to do so. As one interviewee noted: “There’s no time to see
things through.”
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Effects on Institutional Actors
Inexperience, short-sightedness, and time limitations have perhaps had their most profound
impact — nearly all negative — on legislative leaders. Legislative committees also experienced
several problems. On the other hand, observers have seen staffers and lobbyists to have generally
benefitted from term limits.
Leadership
Power in the Arizona Legislature continues to be concentrated in its leaders. The Senate president
and House speaker, who are chosen out of party caucuses, appoint committee chairs and
members, decide which bills go to which committees, and generally control the fate of proposed
measures. Still, interviewees suggested, term limits have made life far more difficult for legislative
leaders to control members. Indeed, some suggested that the effect of term limits on leadership
has been devastating. The Mushroom Coalition and Cellar Dweller rebellions illustrate the
difficulties legislative leaders have had in pulling their caucuses together. 
Under term limits, leaders can be expected to generally rise to the top more quickly but also to
stay there for a briefer period and with reduced influence. The reform has forced the legislature
away from a system where leadership was often an award for long service. It has also meant more
frequent turnover and more frequent and intense competition for these positions. Thus far,
leadership turnover has been particularly apparent in the House. Following the 2000 election, five
new people moved into the six House leadership positions — the only person carried over moved
from majority whip to speaker. Following the 2002 election, another five new people joined the
leadership ranks, the only holdover moved from minority whip to assistant minority leader. While
turnover has not been as great in the Senate, competition
for leadership positions has become more intense as
experienced people moving over from the House have
swelled the ranks of contenders. In 2002, for example,
the term limited speaker of the house managed to get
elected to the Senate and made a serious though
ultimately unsuccessful campaign to become president of
that body.
Interviewees saw leaders under term limits as less likely
to do an effective job because they emerge without the
benefit of years of training and because they become
relatively powerless lame ducks much sooner than in the
past. They were also felt to be less effective because
members, as short-timers, are less inclined to go along
with what leaders want, and more inclined to challenge
their decisions. As a House leader put it in 2003:
“because of term limits the place runs like a mob without
any sense of discipline, adherence to protocol, or respect
for leadership.” Term limits, as suggested in the
Mushroom and Cellar Dweller episodes, have had their
most noticeable impact on the ability of the Republican
party leaders to control their caucuses. 
Table 10
Leadership Turnover*
(in percentages)
Year House Senate Total
1993-94 50% 67% 58%
1995-96 50% 50% 50%
1997-98 50% 100% 75%
1999-00 33% 50% 42%
2001-02 83% 50% 67%
2003-04 83% 67% 75%
*This table was constructed by counting the
number of members in leadership positions who
were not in leadership in the previous legislature
and dividing that number by the total number of
leadership positions. There were 6 leadership
positions in each chamber: speaker of the
house, majority leader, majority whip, minority
leader, minority whip, and assistant minority
leader in the House; and president, majority
leader, majority whip, minority leader, minority
whip, and assistant minority leader in the
Senate.
Source: David Berman, Ph.D., Morrison
Institute for Public Policy, 2004.
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Committees
Term limits have not produced any change in the way committee positions are filled. Chairs and
committee members are chosen by the Senate president and House speaker, not so much
because of seniority, but because of their help in getting the presiding officer elected. 
As in the legislature as a whole, legislative committee positions have been subject to high levels
of turnover in recent years. Committee chair turnover has been particularly noticeable in the
Senate in recent years, in part, because of the change in partisan control of that body. Six of the
current ten Senate committees have been in existence since 1999. Of the six, only one has been
headed by the same person more than two years. The extent to which committee chairs had
immediate previous service on the committee they later headed has ranged considerably from
year to year: six of the ten had such experience in 2001-2002, while only one of ten had such
experience in 2003-2004. In the House, there has been a bit more stability. In this body, 13 of the
current 16 committees have been in existence since 1999 and of the 13, five have been headed
by the same person more than two years. In 2001-2002, seven of the 13 chairs had immediate
past experience on their committees, and in 2003-04, ten of the 13 had this experience. In the
House, committee chairs have commonly moved up from the position of vice chair.
Though the situation varies from house to house, under term limits committees once dominated
by long-time chairs are now being operated by relatively inexperienced people who are less
knowledgeable about the subject areas of the committees. Looking for experienced leaders to
head committees, legislative leaders have sometimes turned to people returning to a legislative
chamber where they had served for several years or to people with long years of service and
leadership in the other house. Legislators with backgrounds as elected municipal officials have
also had the type of experience that has given them an advantage in moving into committee
leadership positions. Leaders too have made some reductions in the number of committees to
make up for the lack of qualified chairs, but, in
some cases, still have turned positions over to
junior people. When it comes to committee
members, some committee chairs have sought
to overcome the inexperience problem by
bringing in specialists for briefing sessions. Often
they have given newcomers vice chair positions
for training purposes. 
Staff
Staff assistance has been of particular
importance in helping newcomers to the Arizona
legislature learn how to do their job. Survey data
collected in 2002, for example, found 44 Arizona
legislators ranking staff more important than a
host of other factors, e.g., working on a
committee or the help of senior colleagues.
Table 11
“When you were first elected to the legislature,
how important were each of the following in
terms of learning how to do your job?”*
Item
Number
Indicating Mean
Legislative staff 44 4.14
Working on a committee 43 4.09
Senior colleagues 44 3.98
Listening to debate on the floor 43 3.91
Trial and error 43 3.56
Formal training 44 3.14
Party leaders 43 2.3
*Arizona legislators' responses on a scale of 1 to 5, from not
important at all to very important.
Source: Carey, et al, 2002.
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Interviews conducted for this study suggest that the legislative staff as a whole has become more
important as a result of term limits: the nonpartisan staff in providing basic information and
showing newcomers how to do things and partisan staff attached to leadership in providing policy
direction. Some felt that the partisan staff had gained considerably more influence than the
nonpartisan staff, indeed, that the partisan staff had gained too much influence. This complaint
came primarily from non-partisan staffers, members of the minority Democratic party, and
moderate Republicans. In the House, some noted, lobbyists first try to win over the leadership
staff, feeling that if they are able to do so, the leaders will follow. Senate members tend to be
more experienced than in the House and, thus, appear less dependent on staff. Currently, the
staff is probably more important to Republicans than Democrats because they have fewer old-
time legislators in office.
Lobbyists
While interviewees saw lobbying groups generally benefitting from the lack of institutional memory
in the legislature as a whole, they differed in their assessment of the impact of lobbyists on
newcomers. The answer depended on who was asked. One view, commonly offered by veteran
legislators, is that new legislators have not only increasingly relied on lobbyists for information but
have been manipulated or misled by lobbyists because they lack experience in dealing with them.
One veteran legislator reported: “I’ve observed new legislators listening to experienced lobbyists.
My orientation is that the biases in these conversations are huge. After a certain amount of time
in this institution, you recognize this bias, but the inexperienced representatives don’t understand
just how flawed this information can be.” Another veteran added: “New legislators sometimes
don’t realize that they are not getting all sides of a story from a lobbyist.” Some newcomers, on
the other hand, reported they were somewhat suspicious of lobbyists. Not knowing who to trust,
they shied away from lobbyists in general or took what they said with a grain of salt. One
newcomer reported that she felt that lobbyists were trying to take advantage of her and others in
the freshman class and, in effect, were saying to each other “lets get them before they know too
much.” She was very hard on lobbyists, wanting to know their qualifications and wanting them to
cut to the point. Other newcomers indicated that they were far from being entirely dependent on
lobbyists — some turned to legislative staff or other legislators for information and guidance or to
people outside the legislature such as university researchers. Some lobbyists interviewed were
happy to report that more and more people were relying on them, while others felt that
newcomers do not rely on them enough.
Overall, it seems fair to say, that because of their lack of knowledge about the issues, some
legislators have been tempted to rely on lobbyists for information and some, no doubt, have been
misled as a result. Lobbyists have also taken advantage of legislative turnover by bringing back bills
rejected in previous years, hoping no one is around who remembers why they were rejected. The
extent of lobbyist influence is probably less severe in the Senate because many members of that
body (currently 19 of the 30) have served in the House and cut their teeth there, learning whom
they can trust and whom they cannot. More generally, though, the traditional notion that lobbyists
are constrained because they depend on building a relationship of trust with legislators and are
likely to be wary of crossing them up may be less applicable in a term limited legislature because
the chances that someone will be around to pay back lobbyists for their misdeeds are reduced.
The turnover stimulated by term limits has generally made the work of lobbyists much more
difficult in that they now have to regularly make contact with and educate a larger stream of
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newcomers. Turnover, though, has hurt some groups far more than others. It has worked to the
particular disadvantage of many old time Arizona lobbyists who had built up long-term
relationships with legislators. Many of these legislators are now gone and have been replaced by
newcomers who don’t have the slightest idea who these old-time lobbyists are. In a sense, the
one-time powerhouses are now in the same boat as everyone else as they scramble to introduce
themselves to the new legislators. 
Term limits, in sum, have not, as its proponents argued, reduced the overall influence of interest
groups. Interest groups in Arizona have always been important and continue to be so. However,
they have had to operate somewhat differently because of term limits. Many have adapted to the
new conditions by spending more and working harder to establish contact with the parade of new
legislators. Those who had relied on long standing contacts with influential senior members have
lost their edge. The future belongs to those who are willing and able to win over transitory leaders
and work harder to ingratiate themselves with a continuous parade of new members and new
leaders. Some are struggling to establish relationships with the passing parade of new members
and new leaders. This situation is not so bad for groups with resources. Some now offer new
campaign services as a way of extending their influence. 
Effects on Climate, Process, Policy, and Status
Looking for other institutional effects takes us into questions of how term limits have affected the
legislative work climate (the level of civility and conflict), the legislative process, legislative
outcomes, and questions concerning the overall status of the legislature vis-à-vis other
institutions.
Civility and Conflict
The lack of civility in the legislature has been a long-term problem, one that was apparent before
voters adopted term limits. The quality of legislative life started to sour during the 1988
impeachment of Mecham and got even worse since AzScam. One legislator who decided to call it
quits in 1992 remarked: “It’s been very hectic, the tensions, the divisiveness. I wake up in the
morning and I tell my wife, ‘I don’t want to go to work.’ It’s not fun anymore.”25 There is a long
history of bitter splits not only between Democrats and Republicans but, perhaps even more
important, among Republicans along ideological lines. 
Interviewees suggested that term limits, if anything, have made the bickering and problem of
trying to build a consensus even worse. Term limits, as evidenced in the Mushroom and Cellar
Dweller rebellions, have added to the conflict by creating a further division within the Republican
party on the basis of time served in the legislature. Term limits also have fomented division by
making it easier for members to defy party leaders and by making it more difficult to work out
partisan or ideological differences because they limit the amount of time legislators have to get to
know each other on a personal basis.
The Process
Term limits have produced little change in how the legislature operates in terms of basic
procedures — though some reforms such as the formal commitment to the 100-day session have
partially reflected the desire to at least publicly define the body as a “citizen legislature.” 
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The emergence of a large group of newcomers more anxious than ever to get involved and make
a mark for themselves has, however, generated pressures for a more inclusive policymaking
process. This has been especially marked in regard to the making of the budget, the most
important thing the legislature does on a regular basis. 
Thus far, term limits have not
brought an increase in the
introduction of legislation. The
number of bills introduced and
passed in the legislature as a
whole has steadily decreased
since 2000. Some observers
suggested, however, that term
limits have led to an increase in
the number of frivolous bills
being introduced by new
legislators to make some sort of
record and/or to please some
interest group. With a weakening
of leadership and the committee
system, some observers saw bills
being passed with less vetting.
On a broader level, observers
linked constant turnover in
members and leaders with more
general chaos, more emotional
decision making, and less
predictable results.
Policy
When it comes to policy,
observers saw term limits
hindering legislative efforts to deal with long-range problems such as air pollution brought on by
population growth and with complicated matters such as the budget. Legislators, because of term
limits, may have to get by with a more superficial understanding of big issues. Term limits,
interviewees felt, also encourage legislators to concentrate on “smaller” issues and short-term
problems for which there is an immediate payoff and to ignore the long-term consequences of
their decisions. Legislators who are inclined to deal with long-term problems are frustrated
because term limits mean they will not be around along enough to solve them. As one interviewee
noted: “There’s no time to see things through.” In the area of regional politics, some rural
legislators fear that term limits weaken rural areas of the state because there has been a practice
in these places to send the same people to the legislature time after time so that they can
gravitate into positions of influence they can use on behalf of the area. 
Status
Over the last several years the Arizona Legislature has seldom received better than a “C” grade
from the public. The legislature’s overall low standing reflects a variety of criticisms. Central
among these are that it has been out of touch with the voters, overrun with lobbyists, and bogged
Table 12
Legislative Bill Totals Since 1990
Bills Introduced Bills Passed
Year Senate House Total Number Percent Bills Vetoed
1990 559 692 1251 417 33% 5
1991 476 503 979 335 34% 12
1992 545 597 1142 369 32% 8
1993 433 393 826 261 32% 2
1994 565 598 1163 380 33% 0
1995 407 550 957 309 32% 8
1996 425 571 996 385 39% 17
1997 468 577 1045 307 29% 7
1998 431 698 1129 315 28% 12
1999 419 706 1125 374 33% 21
2000 559 721 1280 420 33% 2
2001 584 637 1221 416 34% 15
2002 470 712 1182 353 30% 9
2003 367 541 908 285 31% 17
Source: Arizona Capitol Times, 2004.
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down in a decision-making style characterized by behind-the-scene manipulations, intimidation,
deal making, and procedural tricks. Not surprisingly in recent years, there has been a growing
impatience with the legislature and an increased willingness on the part of all types of groups to
use the courts to prod the legislature into action and to use the initiative process to circumvent
the body in order to make changes. Term limits reform reflected this broad pattern of discontent
with the legislature, but it is not clear if it has done much, if anything, to improve citizen
evaluations of the legislature or improve the status of the legislature vis-à-vis other institutions.
On the other hand, there is little to indicate that term limits have escalated the shift of power
away from the legislature. Opponents of term limits felt that the reform would, in particular, play
to the advantage of the governor. Generally, interviewees for this study, did see a gradual shift of
power away from the legislature to the governor. They did not, however, see general power
relations with the governor as having much to do with term limits. These, they felt, were largely set
by the personal qualities and inclinations of the governors, e.g., whether they were proactive or
reactive. Some, though, saw term limits giving agency heads an advantage in dealing with
legislators on budgeting matters and, by default, greater responsibility for coping with long-term
and complex problems. 
Concluding Observations
Many Arizona legislators would, if they could, eliminate or modify the term limit law. Living with
term limits has caused them to make sometimes painful adjustments. To get around the limits,
legislators have frequently considered running for another elective office, most commonly the
other legislative body (even senators have thought about “stepping down” to the House),
swapping legislative seats, and, to at least keep the seat in the family, having a relative fill in for a
term or so. Living with term limits has also forced some out just at the peak of their power and
influence in a legislative body. Overall, though, the effects of the term limits law have been
somewhat mitigated by the ability of legislators to move from house to house.
On the plus side, term limits have given Arizona citizens an increased opportunity to hold
legislative office and encouraged greater competition for legislative and other seats, giving voters
a greater choice among candidates. To some extent term limits have been a force toward a more
inclusive governing process. At the same time, they have generally weakened leadership and, by
bringing in more inexperienced members, generally increased the influence of others in the
process, particularly lobbyists and staff, though not all lobbyists and staff have gained equally.
Recent newcomers to the Arizona Legislature are probably not any less knowledgeable than
previous classes of newcomers. However, under term limits there are more newcomers and
members have less time to learn their jobs. To cope with the problem of bringing members up to
speed, legislative leaders have increased training, both orientation and ongoing, in regard to
issues and the institution. The legislature could do more, but most interviewees noted that
training can only do so much. Several contended there is really no substitute for on-the-job
training or “for jumping into the process.” The rub, at least for some legislators, is that the existing
eight year limit provides too little time to acquire the necessary leadership skills and that just as
these skills are acquired the legislators have to leave.
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